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Abstract 
Considerable research has been conducted on community-based natural resource management in 
rural southern Africa. Many interesting insights have accumulated from the literature on the 
research issues of earlier generations. The challenge is to break new ground by unravelling insights 
relevant to later generations. This study identifies the issue of scale in complex natural resource 
management systems as one of the more important among emerging issues in the sector. The study 
develops a theoretical framework implying trade-offs between deciding for others, deciding with 
others and deciding for oneself in the operation of natural resource policy. This weighted decision 
framework is used to critically interrogate the human ecology of land and resource use across a 
variety of tenurial niches in rural southern Africa. The study argues that in arriving at decisions 
regarding the operation of natural resource policy, the emphasis needs to shift from what should be 
done, to how it should be done. The study suggests that the ‘how it should be done’ of policy 
operation is a calibration problem. The calibration problem concerns itself with reconciling diverse 
preferences through the medium of decisions made for others, with others and for oneself. It is 
concluded that negotiation provides the most appropriate basis for calibration since it reconciles the 
contradictions within and among decisions made for others, with others and for oneself.  
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1 Introduction 
A strong tradition of research on community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) has 
taken hold and is evolving in rural southern Africa. A rich body of knowledge traversing different 
genres of research traditions across a variety of issues has emerged, including for instance: 
indigenous knowledge systems (Matowanyika 1991); decentralisation (Murombedzi 1992; Ntsebeza 
2004); local governance (Conyers 1999; Ntsebeza 2003) management of commons resources 
(Murphree 1991; Rihoy 1995); co-management of resources (Nhira & Matose 1995; Kapungwe 
2000; Kayambazinthu 2000); economic and equity dimensions of natural resource management 
(Brown 1993; Hachileka et al. 1998) gender dimensions of natural resource management (Flintan 
2001; Nemarundwe 2003); and land reform (Kepe & Cousins 2002; Turner et al. 2002). The 
diversity of issues, theoretical perspectives, scales, sectors and resources covered defies 
classification into neat typologies. But for purposes of this study I employ a generic genres and 
generations typology1 to characterise cycles of research attention on the subject across time-scale. 
Drawing mainly from moral and ethical traditions, the bulk of the initial literature appears to have 
been dominated by what may be termed a first-generation research focus, the central thrust of which 
was to de-marginalise the marginalised managers of natural resources2 (Berkes & Farvar 1989; 
Bromley & Cernea 1989; Murphree 1990, 1991; Rihoy 1995). Although this pioneering genre of 
research shows leanings towards the realm of advocacy it played a very important role in 
overcoming the hitherto existing barriers by popularising and arguing the case for CBNRM. With 
the benefit of hindsight, such leanings appear understandable – the sheer magnitude of the extent to 
which communities were marginalised in partaking of the benefits accruing from the management 
of nature required a strong, if non-compromising, argument for alternatives.3  
The notion of CBNRM as a moral and ethical argument against the marginalisation of communities 
from the benefits of nature management still needs to be vigorously pursued. But, over time, need 
arose for analytical approaches that look beyond de-marginalisation. Hence the emergence of a 
second-generation research cycle focusing on interactive dimensions of decentralisations at the 
grassroots and other levels. Borrowing mainly from the pragmatic and realist traditions, the 
incipient second-generation cycle has begun to ask essential questions about the political economy 
of such decentralisations, such as: Who is the community? How is community defined? Where does 
the locus of power lie and with what effect? Who benefits most and how? Interactive aspects of 
decentralisation have begun to receive attention from a variety of perspectives, including on the 
themes of ethnicity and social exclusion (Madzudzo 2002), gender and inclusiveness (Nabane 1997; 
Flintan 2001), power dynamics across scale (Hasler 1993), benefit sharing and equity structures and 
the ways in which these become distorted (Shackleton & Campbell 2001). 
A third-generation research focus also appears to be emerging. Based mainly on complex systems 
theoretical frameworks (Gunderson & Holling 2001; Ruitenbeek & Cartier 2001), some aspects of 
this emerging genre of research emphasise the transformational aspects of decentralisation, which 
they seek to meld with an adaptive function (Reason & Torbett 2001). Approaches that seek to 
harness the transformational aspects of decentralisation with a view to delivering livelihood and 
other impacts are more commonly classified under action research (Reason & Bradbury 2003).  
From a complex systems perspective the question of scale provides another important third-
generational research issue that is gaining increasing currency, and it has been tackled from a range 
of perspectives. For instance, IIRR (2000) see ‘going to scale’ as ‘bringing more benefits to more 
people more quickly, more equitably and more lastingly’, a perspective that sees scale assuming an 
extension and dissemination character. However, Lovell at el. (2003) tackle scale largely from a 
completely different perspective of fitting the sum of parts into the whole – from both biophysical 
and social perspectives. Murphree (2000), in his article on boundaries and borders, sees scale as 
nuanced reconciliation of the top-down with the bottom-up in the operation of natural resource 
governance. In other words, Murphree’s model of scale considers the peculiarities of what exactly 
1 
Commons Southern Africa occasional paper series; no. 10 
should be reconciled. This study extends on this model by considering the diversity of arenas in 
which trade-offs should be crafted in the operation of natural resource policy. The study achieves 
this by borrowing from social psychological traditions (for example, Reason & Heron 1995) to 
develop a theoretical template that entails reconciling diverse preferences that get variously asserted 
through decisions made for others, decisions made with others and decisions made for oneself. The 
study then employs the template to critically analyse the operation of natural resource policy across 
a wide range of contexts in southern Africa. The wide diversity of contexts is analytically 
acknowledged through the use of Fortmann and Nhira’s (1992) formulation of tenurial niches. The 
concept of tenurial niches recognises the biophysical and institutional heterogeneity of woodlands 
in communal and other settings.  
In the next section, I consider theoretical perspectives that locate decisions made for others with 
those made with others and for oneself within a complex systems setting. I argue that reconciling 
preferences through the media of the above decision-making frameworks is an important dimension 
in the operation of natural resource policy. The following two sections apply the template in an 
analysis of the operation of natural resource policy in southern Africa at a range of scales, including 
the global, regional, national and sub-national. The final section draws the report together by 
situating the theory and empirical experiences within the context of issues raised in the introduction.  
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2 Theoretical perspectives on scale and reconciling of decisions  
Scale, level, extent, resolution 
Scale now increasingly lies at the heart of natural resource policy and practice (Farrington & Boyd 
1997; Toh-Kyeong et al. 1998; Murphree 2000; Lovell et al. 2003). More than ever before, many 
practitioners now factor scale into various facets of their natural resource management initiatives. 
The rise of scale in natural resource policy and practice is evidenced by an ever-expanding 
vocabulary of associated derivatives – going to scale, up-scaling, down-scaling, scaling out, scaling 
up and out, and so on. The expanse of the emerging vocabulary presumably provides salutary 
inspiration to those at the frontiers of this new and evolving genre of research and development – 
hopefully providing insights on how things can be done better. But paradoxically, this repertoire of 
terms appears to be as much about celebrating newfound insights as it is about the frustrations of 
understanding scale as an otherwise fuzzy and complex concept.  
The fuzziness and complexity of scale notwithstanding, this study borrows heavily from the 
somewhat neat, if simplistic, definitions of scale and scale-related concepts presented in a review of 
scaling issues in the social sciences by Toh-Kyeong et al. (1998). The review article defines scale as 
the spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used by scientists to measure and study 
objects and processes. The authors argue that scaling issues encompass notions of both level and 
scale, since level refers to location along a dimension of scale, which may span from micro to 
macro in spatial terms, and from short to medium to long duration in temporal terms. In similar 
fashion all scales have extent and resolution, with the former referring to a calibrated dimension of 
scale. For instance, temporal extent may range from days to weeks, to years to decades and 
millennia, whilst spatial extent may span from millimetres to metres to kilometres. Resolution refers 
to fineness of measurement along a particular scale, ranging from fine to coarse, with grain being 
the finest unit of resolution. 
Hierarchies and policy targeting 
Scale assumes a more complex character in real life systems. This is not least because components 
of such systems get variously linked across levels of scale giving rise to hierarchies (Toh-Kyeong et 
al. 1998; Ruitenbeek & Cartier 2001). And in most real life hierarchies, including those in the 
natural resource management sector, components of lower levels of systems are combined into new 
units that have unitary functions and emergent properties – characteristics of larger units are not 
necessarily simple attributes of smaller units (Ruitenbeek & Cartier 2001). Such complex 
hierarchies are alternatively also referred to as panarchies, which consist of interconnected human 
and natural systems, whose components exhibit dynamic characteristics of adaptive cycles at a 
range of scales (Gunderson & Holling 2001; Ruitenbeek & Cartier 2001). In simple terms, the logic 
of adaptive cycles implicitly subsumes built-in failsafe4 mechanisms that, over time, enable nature 
to resolve the contradictions of the order and disorder5 inherent in it. Such logic therefore has a 
foreclosure effect – it implicitly makes a very strong case for the ‘do nothing’ scenario as a policy 
option in many natural resource management systems, most of which are panarchies. In more 
permissive perspective, it is a logic of restraint that recommends the deployment of active policy 
only in instances where it is best poised to be in the service of enhancing resilience and 
sustainability. In that sense, the essence of policy deployment in panarchies probably has less to do 
with its operation in sequel phases than with the substance of its intent and the precision of its 
targeting in preparatory stages. Well-targeted6 policies presumably deliver better impact in terms of 
resilience or sustainability because they stand a better chance of ‘pushing the right buttons’ 
(Ruitenbeek & Cartier 2001). More often than not, policy gets deployed in panarchies with reckless 
abandon, with little or no regard to its consequence on resilience and sustainability.  
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More realistically, improving resilience and sustainability cannot be guaranteed with certainty, 
regardless of whether policy is either well-targeted or sparingly or profusely deployed. This is not 
least because policy subsumes action, and thus constitutes an important driver of change (Ludwig et 
al. 1997; Trosper 1998). Policy therefore entails change and any change engenders the emergence 
of new transitions (McGrath & Moeliono 2004). And because the whole seldom accords with the 
sum of its parts in terms of system behaviour in panarchies, emergent transitions may have very 
little to do with the incipient variables for which policy change was initially targeted. Thus, the 
deployment of policy in natural resource management arenas often results in unintended 
consequences or unforeseen effects. These effects often hit back with a vengeance and are hence 
also alternatively referred to as revenge or ‘Ouroboros’ effects (Swenson 2002). Revenge effects of 
policy action are fittingly depicted by the Ouroboros symbol of a serpent devouring its own tail 
(Swenson 2002).  
Panarchies and the calibration of policy decisions 
The policy arena is essentially a decision-making arena, and reconciling multiple interests through 
policy decisions in complex systems settings is easier said than done. This is largely because, as 
centres of consciousness within the cosmos, human beings are both autonomous and linked in a 
generative web of dynamic communion with other humans and the rest of the world. In that sense, 
choices arrived at within such arenas will always encompass elements of deciding for others 
(hierarchy), deciding with others (collaboration) and deciding for oneself (autonomy) (Reason & 
Heron 1995). A profound tension exists between the need for hierarchy, collaboration and 
autonomy in societal decision-making processes. The contours of such tension are further 
confounded by the multiple and dynamic nature of actors in everyday natural resource management 
settings. Thus, decisions based on the logic of hierarchy or collaboration are usually only as secure 
and relevant as the extent to which those aspiring for autonomy respect and observe them, and vice 
versa (Frost & Mandondo 1999). Moreover, because of the fluidity of their interests and priorities, 
people’s affinities to decisions made by others, with others and for oneself often switch in ways that 
are at best complex and unpredictable. The question of co-ordinating policy decisions across scale 
therefore poses a real challenge to those aspiring to design policies for deployment in panarchies. 
We do not as yet have an instructive toolkit on how the above functions can be traded off, although 
sage advice emphasises balance. For instance, Reason and Heron (1995) offer the following 
perceptive insights with regards to balance of decision-making scales in complex systems policy 
arenas:  
• authentic (parsimonious) hierarchy provides appropriate direction by those with greater 
vision, skill and experience 
• collaboration roots the individual within a community of peers, offering basic support and 
the creative corrective feedback of other views and possibilities  
• autonomy expresses the self-creating and self-transfiguring potential of the person. 
The above aphorisms make the case for striking a balance, but they fail to define how such balance 
can be achieved. But calibrating policy balance in panarchies is no mean feat. Privileging top-down 
decisions of hierarchy through the bestowment of discretionary oversight in a few upper-level 
actors presumably provides a handy shortcut to the red tape associated with consultative decision-
making frameworks (Ribot 2004). But if expediency and less red tape are the virtues of top-down 
decisions of hierarchy, then arbitrariness and opacity may be their vices, while the converse holds 
true for collaboration. Meanwhile, the notion of autonomy should not necessarily be seen as 
‘splendid isolation’ since the imperatives of hierarchy also filter down and impinge on this level, 
and vice versa. Equally, the imperatives of collaboration may also filter into the operation of 
regimes of hierarchy, and vice versa. In fact, in its various shades, collaboration provides the 
mechanism for the reconciliation of diverse interests and preferences within and across various 
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levels of social and political organisation. But intuitively, each decision-making framework has 
zones of its own effectiveness, with the calibration dilemma being how to strike some measure of 
good fit. 
The wide repertoire of terms associated with concept of scale is probably a revealing admission of 
the lack of good fit that arises from the usually less than meticulous calibration or targeting of 
natural resource policy. For instance, scaling down implicitly reveals an over-calibration problem, 
and it invokes the image of a dwarf’s feet being fitted into a giant’s shoes. Equally, the notion of 
scaling up appears to imply an under-targeting problem, and conjures the image of a dwarf’s shoes 
being forcibly extended to fit a giant’s feet. Both sides of the above metaphor portray an enormous 
measure of the futility that underlies why natural resource management initiatives that are out of 
phase with scale often yield less than anticipated impact. Expanding or downsizing the geographies 
of fit and impact in panarchies is seldom successful, not least because the whole is never equal to 
the sum of its parts in terms of system behaviour in such settings (Farrington & Boyd 1997). 
Neither do the parts become uniform repositories of the collective behaviour of the whole.  
Variations in system behaviour at a range of scales thus constrain the extent to which the impacts of 
policy can be anticipated. And policies that are out of phase with scale predispose themselves and 
the natural and human systems in which they operate to even greater risk from the vagaries of 
unintended effects. Thus, the unintended effects of policies, like a serpent devouring its own tail, 
often bite back with a vengeance, resulting in policy failure. Such effects may also generate 
perverse incentives in the human ecology of resource use and management in arenas in which the 
policies operate, resulting in an array of pathologies considered in the next sub-section. The 
pervasiveness of bite-backs and perverse incentives in the operation of natural resource policy 
requires that vantage points be incorporated into the architecture and design of such policy. Such 
vantage points should ideally be equipped with anticipatory toolkits7 that help identify and resolve 
unintended effects in the operation of natural resource policy. In other words, policies should be 
deployed with circumspection since they have inherent propensities to generate unintended effects.  
Prudence in the operation of natural resource policy is related to the precautionary principle 
(Ruitenbeek 1997), which argues for caution before things are done, or reversal if things are done 
and are not going according to plan. Some of the mechanisms through which policy can be reversed 
include constant adjustments through review, or complete overhauls through revocation (Coglianese 
& Nicolaidis 1996).8 The essence of these mechanisms in the operation of natural resource policy in 
southern Africa is the ambiguity of defining the appropriate scale of actors who should wield and 
exercise powers of policy revocation and reversal. More often than not, such powers reside in 
central nodes of authority whose authoritative reach falls way short of their implementational grasp 
(Murphree 1990). Sadly, actors manning such loci of authority generally appear averse to the 
alteration of such a status quo (Murphree 1990; Murombedzi 1992). And this obviously falls far 
short of according with best practice in natural resource management. In accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, best practice presumably occurs when the upper-level actors do not usurp 
the resourcefulness9 of ordinary people (Schilling 1995), for example, through over-centralisation. 
In line with Catholic social teaching, the moral is about protecting basic justice – and basic justice is 
protected when powers are placed as close to the citizens as possible, with upper-level actors 
undertaking only those roles that are beyond the scope of lower-level actors (Schilling 1995).  
Generic pathologies of ill-phased calibration and targeting 
The whole seldom accords with the sum of its parts in terms of policy impact in natural resource 
management arenas because decision making or preference formulation frameworks are either too 
domineering, or fail to build synergies with each other, or encroach into zones of each other’s 
effectiveness. In practice, calibration permits autonomy in certain contexts, dictates collaboration in 
others, and sometimes, larger scales require hierarchy. I posit the following propositions about over-
strays: 
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• The encroachment of autonomy into zones of collaboration results in institutional 
disjunction commonly referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). But, over 
time, the enormity of the tragedy presumably triggers the failsafe response of collective 
action in which institutions evolve to reconcile self-interest against the common good (see 
Berkes & Farvar 1989; Ostrom 1990). 
• The encroachment of hierarchy into zones of collaboration causes the erosion or breakdown 
of collaboration institutions (see Campbell et al. 2001), or it may hit back through the 
Ouroboros effect. This is because collaborators often ‘vote with their feet’10 against the 
maligning hierarchy regimes, resulting in policy failure. 
• The encroachment of collaboration into zones of autonomy often undermines the self-
creating and self-transfiguring potential of the individual, and may thus curtail industry and 
enterprise.  
In similar fashion, I also suggest the following propositions about excesses, which impinge on the 
structuring of power and the cost-effectiveness of decision making: 
• Excessive hierarchy results in shades of despotism, which can either be centralised or 
decentralised (Mamdani 1996). Despotic orientations may also be re-centralised in sub-
national bodies that enjoy minor legal and administrative competence (Murombedzi 1992). 
• Excessive collaboration often leads to stasis and gridlock in decision-making (Coglianese 
2000).11 
• Excessive autonomy is likely to engender social chaos not far from a Hobbesian state of 
nature in which life is ‘short, brutish and nasty’. But such a state of nature presumably, in 
failsafe logic, provides the impetus for the evolution of institutions towards the common 
good. 
Lastly, the following can be said about the ‘splendid isolation’ of exclusive arenas of policy 
operation: 
• Exclusive autonomy constitutes a ‘splendid isolation’ in which enterprise and industry 
potentially thrive, but which often entrenches privilege. Over time, such privilege is only as 
secure as the extent to which there is equity in the broader political economy in which such 
splendid isolations exists. 
• Exclusive collaboration probably exists only in the minds of those who want to shield 
‘primitive’ tribal communities from the disruptive modernising encounter. Malinowski’s 
(1922, 1944) ‘noble savages in harmony with nature’ aptly portrays this thinking. 
Elsewhere, the culture and religions of such people are lauded as being ‘profoundly 
ecological’ (Schoffeleers 1978), whilst the ecosystems in which such people live are 
portrayed as being ‘ritually directed’ (Rappaport 1967). Such images of tribal organisation 
are probably only as real as the extent to which distance proves to be a barrier against the 
assimilation of such communities into broader national and global communities. 
• Exclusive hierarchy represents the ‘splendid isolation’ of protected areas. In practice, the 
isolation of protected areas is only as splendid as the degree to which hierarchy laws that 
enforce such isolation provide a bulwark against tenurial and use pressure from surrounding 
peasant communities (Fortmann & Nhira 1992).  
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In this section I have reviewed some theoretical perspectives relating to the concept of scale in the 
operation of natural resource policy. In the next section, I apply the above framework to 
characterise critically the human ecology of land and resource use in southern Africa. I lay special 
emphasis on land and resources within a human ecological context of their use and decision-
making. Thus, the report also encompasses aspects of land use and resource use, and extends to 
land-use and resource-use decision-making.  
7 
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3 Implications of scale in the operation of global and regional natural 
resource policy in southern Africa 
As argued earlier, collaboration often provides the invisible wand12 that reconciles the collective 
interests of concern for others with the invisible hand of narrow preferences of concern for self. 
This section considers issues relating to the reconciliation of preferences in the operation of global 
and regional natural resource policies from a southern African perspective. 
The operation of global natural resource policies in southern Africa 
At the broadest scale of resolution, collaboration among national hierarchy regimes has created 
institutions that integrate shared international values and preferences among communities of 
nations. Such institutions find effect in global conventions and protocols. The Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification are among those most pertinent 
for the southern Africa scenario (Chipeta, pers. comm.13). This is because the largely arid to semi-
arid climatic conditions of the region are associated with an array of biological resources in a fragile 
environment in which the threat of desertification appears to loom large.  
But international conventions and protocols are only as effective as the degree to which they 
articulate executable programmes of action that translate the shared visions into development 
action. Such programmes are seldom executed – either because the will does not exist, or where it 
does exist, because there are no resources for implementation. Thus, most protocols and 
conventions largely remain mere declarations of intent. The conventions on biological diversity and 
on desertification are often more cynically referred to as the ‘poor man’s conventions’.14 This 
signifies the limited extent to which such conventions are implemented in southern Africa, where 
pervasive poverty constrains the extent to which governments can juggle limited fiscal resources for 
development. Hence, such conventions are usually implemented through localised projects 
supported by benevolent donors in the North, rather than through thorough-going national 
programmes. The huge range of natural resource management initiatives that derived from 
international conventions in rural southern Africa is an acknowledgement of the impact that such 
conventions have had within the region.  
But, paradoxically, the strength of the northern dollar often provides the lever through which the 
deep green ethos of a global (Western) environmental discourse and scientific culture encroaches 
into the formation of natural resource policy in rural southern Africa. Global (Western) hierarchy 
preferences articulated through international conventions often use the terms and conditions of these 
self-same conventions to argue the case for the perpetuation of exclusive collaboration in remote 
enclaves of southern Africa. For instance, biological diversity is invoked to justify the insulation of 
primordial forms of tribal order – the assumed repositories of an intrinsic ecological harmony – 
from the ‘disruptive’ thrust of national integration. The widely publicised case of the San of 
Botswana, whose cause for ‘splendid isolation’ is being forcefully championed by the London-
based Survival International, probably provides the most telling example of the encroachment of 
global hierarchical values and preferences. Despite the best of its intentions, such international 
cultural and environmental advocacy cannot completely escape the stigma of eco-imperialism, to 
which it becomes but a subtle manifestation, particularly to the more radical and abrasive fringe of 
Africanist scholarship.15 Only time will tell, but the efficacy of such advocacy is likely to depend on 
the degree to which the global hierarchy reconciles itself with Botswana’s own national preferences 
of autonomy. This is not to imply, though, that all forms of donor support finding their way to 
southern Africa through the conduits of international conventions are malicious. As argued earlier, 
they do make a difference – having something done as opposed to nothing being done. 
8 
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The operation of regional natural resource policies in southern Africa 
At a slightly lower scale of resolution, regional policies have evolved as institutional mechanisms 
for nations to address the trans-boundary and spill-over effects of resource use and management. 
Such policies have been most prominent in the water, fisheries and wildlife sectors. This is because 
the fugitive properties of these resources defy the confines of national territory or administrative 
units. For instance, regional co-operation among countries of the Zambezi Basin has given rise to 
the Zambezi River Authority. Equally, The University of the Witwatersrand’s Centre for Water in 
the Environment hosts the Mozambique-South Africa Rivers Research Programme as a bilateral 
initiative to reconcile the spill-over impacts of rivers that originate in South Africa and traverse the 
Kruger National Park into Mozambique. The current cohort of the CASS-PLAAS research 
programme16 also features researchers looking at similar issues of scale across a variety of settings. 
Kokwe and Kokwe’s (in draft) work centres on a Zambian headwater wetland (dambo) in which 
human activities in adjacent uplands renders the dambo prone to seasonal drying. Malasha (in draft) 
and Njaya (in draft) consider related issues from the perspective of artisanal fishery in the inland 
lake settings of Lakes Kariba (between Zimbabwe and Zambia), and Chiuta (between Malawi and 
Mozambique), respectively. Meanwhile, Chikozho (in draft) considers prospects for reforms in the 
water management sector by examining the case of a major river system in South Africa.  
All the above initiatives envisage reconciling spill-over impacts through policy intervention. The 
policy of reconciling spill-over impacts arising from the lateral flow of water resources ideally rests 
on five conceptual response pillars: (1) modifying the incentives for land users whose land-use 
practices affect the lateral flows; (2) mitigating the effects of lateral flows by enhancing filters17 in 
the landscape; (3) shielding off external stakeholders from the effects of the lateral flows; (4) 
compensating those who are impacted negatively; or (5) doing nothing if the potential benefit is 
outweighed by the transaction costs of the response (excerpted verbatim from Swallow et al. 2001). 
As argued earlier, while these words of wisdom are perceptive, they are non-instructive inasmuch as 
they identify what should be done without defining who should do it. More instructive insights 
should ideally provide pointers on whether each and every one of the above pillars of policy action 
is best secured through decisions made for others, or those made with others, or those made for 
oneself, or through trade-offs – that also need to be clearly identified. Without being overly 
prescriptive, the work of Njaya and Malasha indicates that co-management in artisanal fishing in 
both lakes was a sequel response to preceding scenarios in which resource-use relations were 
essentially open access. Extreme open access denotes overdoses of excessive autonomy in which 
everyone uses resources as they please. In line with the earlier logic of the ‘short life of nasty and 
brutish effects’, these systems evolved from open access into co-management regimes, implying 
that excessive autonomy ultimately proved unsustainable.18 The notion of evolution here 
encompasses the idea of necessity or demand as a key driver of change.  
Trans-frontier parks are another emergent phenomenon of natural resource policy in southern 
Africa. Such parks use wildlife as an entry point to consolidating people, their cultures and their 
environments and economies beyond the confines of national boundaries. The centrality of wildlife 
in trans-frontier wildlife management ventures basically answers to an ecology theorem of 
biodiversity conservation that views expanded habitat as being synonymous with greater diversity, 
with the later being seen as good (a highly value-laden term).19 Other aspects of the goodness of 
wildlife diversity presumably relate to its higher economic value in comparison with other natural 
resources, and hence its location at the centre of grandiose regional integration agendas. But the 
extent to which such plans foster genuine integration depends on the degree to which their equity 
structures prove to be a bond for cementing diverse interests across a range of scales. More often 
than not, such structures get distorted through bureaucratic rent capture (Murombedzi 1992) and 
elite capture (Oyono 2004), and these phenomena can be opportunistic or systemic. Systemic rent-
capture by bureaucrats signifies ‘over-targeting’. It often manifests itself through legal regimes of 
hierarchy that bestow discretionary oversight of natural resource policy on levels that are remote 
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from the citizens affected (Murombedzi 1992), and epitomises how differential power results in 
differential appropriations.  
Well-meaning legal regimes of hierarchy can also be manipulated to entrench differential 
appropriation, or elite capture in its more systemic forms. This potentially plays out through 
indigenisation and affirmative action policies that present powerful networks of elite actors with the 
tools with which to appropriate rents and benefits at the expense of the ordinary citizenry. In the 
case of Zimbabwe, the heat and opacity of radical land reform has provided the mask behind which 
the narrow interests of appropriative entrepreneurs play out against the interests of the poor, even in 
trans-frontier zones (Chaumba et al. 2003). And because of its enormous potential in terms of 
ecotourism and the safari hunting industries, the much-vaunted Great Limpopo Trans-Frontier Park 
cannot necessarily be considered ascetic to the speculative gaze of nefarious investors, some of 
whom may exploit the good intentions of affirmative action to entrench their own interests. The 
Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park brings together South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 
the management of wildlife resources occurring in the Kruger National Park, the Limpopo National 
Park and the Gonarezhou National Park respectively. Ironically, some segments of the rural poor 
face forcible displacement from their homelands to make way for the implementation of the 
grandiose plan. In that sense, such communities stand to suffer a ‘double expropriation’20 that 
combines the shock of initial displacement from land, with a lingering affliction of impaired access 
to benefits accruing from nature management. The pronouncement by the Zimbabwean government 
that safari hunting leases in such areas are tenable only over 25-year periods21 presumably provides 
review and revoke (sunset) provisions that will potentially foster equity along the temporal scale, 
assuming it effectively allows new players to come in. The next section employs the weighted 
decision-making framework to characterise the operation of natural resource policy at much lower 
levels of resolution, including the national and sub-national. 
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4 A tenurial niche approach to the operation of national resource 
management polices of southern Africa 
Fortmann and Nhira’s (1992) tenurial niche formulation combines a biophysical dimension of 
spatial variations in resource status with an institutional dimension of what is feasible in terms of 
management within each niche. This section employs the same formulation to analyse the 
interaction of policy decisions across the following: resources in protected areas; resources in 
communal areas; and resources on private land.  
Resources in protected areas: Splendid isolations of hierarchy preferences?  
Protected areas constitute a central feature of the human ecology of southern Africa with, on 
average, no less than 10% of the total landmasses of all countries within the region having been set 
aside as national parks and protected forests (Murphree & Cumming 1991). Traditionally, the main 
form of management in protected areas is exclusion management that is enforced by the various 
countries’ national forestry and wildlife agencies. But the hierarchy laws that enforce such 
exclusions do not render the protected areas entirely free of tenurial and use pressure from other 
actors. For instance, most protected areas are surrounded by peasant communities, or share 
boundaries with them. Peasant communities in places adjacent to protected areas often settle on the 
protected lands or use resources from them, despite the overbearing effect of the national hierarchy 
laws. States in southern Africa invariably lack the resources and capacity to enforce such laws. 
Peasant communities use resources in protected areas for a variety of reasons, including the relative 
abundance and nearness of resources within the protected areas, and to stake historical and ancestral 
claims to the protected areas (Vermeulen 1994). Autonomy preference regimes also insert 
themselves into such zones, often through the intervening agency of scheming politicians, who 
reportedly incite peasants to occupy the land, but move in to assert their own appropriative interests 
when peasants ‘liberate’ such lands (see Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice 1992; Nhira et 
al. 1998).22 Thus, even if national hierarchy laws privilege national agency authorities over the 
benefits of nature, in practice such structurally differentiated power does not remain uncontested as 
other actors also variously assert their own individual or collective appropriative interests. 
Over time, regimes of exclusion have, by and large, proved untenable. Thus collaboration has 
emerged – in its various shades – as the mechanism of choice for reconciling the contradictions 
between decisions made for others with those made with others and for oneself in protected 
landscapes of southern Africa. Spatial variations in resource endowment across the region 
determine the nature of resources that have entered the co-management arena. In Malawi, for 
instance, village natural resource management committees provide the vehicle through which 
peasant communities surrounding state forests co-manage the forests in conjunction with the 
Forestry Department (Kayambazinthu 2000). In Zimbabwe’s Mafungautsi State Forest Reserve, 
variously constituted resource management committees provide the basis on which the Forestry 
Commission manages the forest in conjunction with local peasant communities (Mapedza & 
Mandondo 2002). In the case of Zambia, game management areas – constituted in communal areas 
adjacent to national parks – have been the main vehicles through which the Department of National 
Parks and Wildlife Services has incorporated peasant communities in the management of wildlife 
resources. Mumbwa Game Management Area, adjacent to the Kafue National Park, is one of the 
many initiatives in which Zambia’s peasant communities have variously benefited from shared 
management of wildlife resources under the Administrative Design for Game Management Areas 
Programme (Admade) (Kapungwe 2000). The collaborative management lingo commonly refers to 
areas where most of the above peasant communities lie adjacent to protected areas as buffer zones 
(see, for example, Bromley 1994; Salafsky 1994). 
It is undeniable that some co-management initiatives have had significant livelihood and other 
impacts in areas in which they operate. But for a variety of reasons, some initiatives fail dismally in 
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delivering the magnitude of impact expected, particularly along its more tangible livelihood 
dimensions. This is because, by default or design, many such initiatives often operate out of phase 
with the salience23 of resources on which peasant livelihoods really hinge. For instance, 
Zimbabwe’s Mafungautsi collaborative management case relies mainly on a limited set of non-
timber forest products, such as broom grass, as entry points to introducing the shared management 
regimes. But valuation studies conducted in Mafungautsi and other protected forests appear to 
suggest that peasant communities adjacent to such forests value land and grazing resources in the 
forests more than the minor forest products the co-management initiatives tend to focus on (Gwaai 
Working Group 1997). The hidden logic is that the extraction of such minor forest products impacts 
less on the ecological integrity of the protected areas (Mapedza & Mandondo 2002). In that sense, 
co-management arrangements cannot easily escape the stigma of buffer institutions that protect 
resources from undesirable regimes of use and so on – such arrangements are only as effective as 
co-equal partnerships prove to be relevant to the livelihoods of the target communities. 24  
The buffering effect of co-management arrangements is also likely to depend on the extent to which 
they meet the assumptions of co-equal partnerships in which all parties have equal power at the 
negotiating table (Matzke 1993). Sadly, existing power relations are skewed, as parties that 
represent majority interests in most co-management initiatives seldom enjoy a co-equal partnership 
status. The overweening dominance of national wildlife and forestry agencies in co-management 
arenas has been reported across a variety of cases in southern Africa, including in the operation of 
Zambia’s game management areas (Kapungwe 2000), in Malawi’s village natural resource 
management committees (Kayambazinthu 2000) and Zimbabwe’s resource management 
committees (Mandondo & Mapedza 2003). Such dominance invariably serves to undermine the 
commitment of the ordinary people for whom such bodies ostensibly provide conduits for a 
collective voice. Both of the above problems relating to the operation of policy in protected areas 
signify failure to reconcile hierarchy preferences with other intervening preferences, as is evidenced 
by continued intrusions into the protected areas. 
When placed within the context of broader national political economies of imbalances in the 
distribution of land – such as in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe – co-management 
arrangements may carry the additional stigma of delaying tactics and diversionary pursuits that 
potentially divert attention away from fundamentally more important empowerment pathways, 
including land reform. Such a verdict appears even more pertinent when the net and per capita 
benefits of such initiatives are factored into the comparative accounts of the broader rural economy 
that is largely remittance-driven (Campbell et al. 2002), and in which livestock presents the main 
medium of household accumulation (Murombedzi 2001). To radical Africanist scholarship, land 
reform therefore presents the main pathway for re-uniting hitherto marginalised indigenous 
communities with their agrarian and environmental heritage. The more abrasive inclinations of such 
scholarship may view co-management initiatives as fire-fighting measures designed to secure 
environmental values by extinguishing the backlash of peasant land and resource re-appropriation 
claims.25 More realistically, the ease with which such a backlash can be extinguished will depend 
on the extent to which national hierarchy preferences discount environmental values against the 
livelihood imperatives of the buffer zone communities, with the balance of emergent outcomes still 
standing contestable by a variety of other actors.  
For example, coarse-grain radical land reform in Zimbabwe has episodically had the effect of 
discounting environmental values of protected areas against the livelihood imperatives of peasant 
communities in surrounding buffer zones. Chaumba et al. (2003) recorded tacit official approval of 
land grabs in the Gonarezhou National Park of Zimbabwe’s south-east Lowveld. But the transience 
of such outcomes is signified by the immediacy with which national agency custodians of such 
resources make haste to reclaim lost territory,26 usually as soon as political temperatures start 
cooling down (Chaumba et al. 2003). In contrast, the South African experience appears to reflect a 
more cautious and finer-grained character, in which indigenous communities are united with their 
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environmental and agrarian heritage through restitutions that are mediated through formal courts of 
law (Steenkemp & Urh 2000). One such successful claim has attempted a delicate balance between 
environmental needs and livelihood imperatives by an ex-situ extension of restitution privileges of a 
25 000ha portion of the Kruger National Park to a displaced segment of the South African 
peasantry, the Makuleke community (Steenkemp & Urh 2000). In this case the community benefits 
ex-situ through revenues accruing from ecotourism and wildlife-based leases of such land. That is, 
they are not literally re-united with their environmental heritage in the physical sense of re-
occupation of lost territory, but in a more symbolic sense as owners and recipients of the accruing 
environmental rents. This is not to suggest that relations in South African buffer zones are 
necessarily always more egalitarian or free from rent capture by elite networks. To the contrary, 
Cocks (2000) describes how urban-based entrepreneurs have secured privileged access to scrub-
biome resources, including medicinal plants, in South Africa’s Great Fish River Reserve complex. 
This happens within a setting in which residents’ associations that are inclined to the ruling party of 
that country have emerged as the de facto local custodians and managers of the resource at the 
expense of traditional and other institutions.  
Protected areas could also be affected by the spectre of land reform and affirmative action in 
Namibia, where there are also glaring imbalances in the distribution of land. Such a scenario 
probably applies less to Zambia and Mozambique because of their relatively high land 
resource/human population density ratios, and Malawi where the reverse sets a limit to which 
fulsome land redistribution is feasible. In the following sub-section I focus on balancing preferences 
within the context of the human ecology of Southern Africa’s communal lands. 
Resources in communal lands 
In terms of magnitude of human populations, communal areas of southern Africa are by far the 
most important, with such lands being home to the majority of the people in almost all countries 
within the region. For instance, close to 70% of the people in countries like Zimbabwe and Namibia 
live in communal areas (Jones & Murphree 2001). Communal land populations are, nevertheless, 
significantly lower in South Africa because of its higher degree of urbanisation. But paradoxically, 
despite their dominance in terms of human numbers, communal areas are the least economically 
developed, in per capita terms. The underdeveloped state of southern Africa’s communal areas is 
rooted in issues of governance, and mainly arises from a political history of colonial neglect and the 
privileging of racially-based preferences.  
Colonial neglect of African reserves was largely the result of a fiscal apartheid in public sector 
capital investment policies (Wekwete 1990). The bulk of the social and physical infrastructure was 
located in European areas to support a fledging capitalist economy, which was further supported 
with much official subsidy and preferential marketing polices (Murphree & Cumming 1991; 
McGregor 1991). Under-investment in the African reserves reinforced the under-development of 
the peasant sector, which remained a source of cheap labour for the emerging capitalist economy.27 
Over time the peasant sector was also weakened by the downstream effects of a communal tenure 
system under conditions of high population growth – including lack of collateral, subdivision into 
smaller and smaller holdings, low productivity and declining surpluses, and very low propensities to 
save and invest (Phimister 1988; McGregor 1991; Dore 1993). Such neglect left a deeper imprint in 
those countries where the colonial experience lingered longer – like Zimbabwe, Namibia and South 
Africa (Mamdani 1996). 
The distinction between European citizens and African subjects thus provided the power divide 
along which race-based privileges were entrenched through the colonial experience (Mamdani 
1996). European citizens enjoyed the benefits of direct rule, including a system guaranteeing free 
enterprise, recourse to justice, electoral privileges and a system of governance based on the 
separation of powers. Whilst Europeans enjoyed the privileges of a citizen status, African subjects 
were consigned to the realm of the customary. The distinguishing features of the customary 
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included submission to regimes of tribal authority that operated under the tight administrative 
oversight of European native commissioners, under a system of indirect rule. Such regimes of tribal 
authority are often characterised as having been ‘clenched fists’, a formulation that portrays the 
extent to which they combined the arbitrariness of fused legislative, executive and judiciary roles 
within the persons of hereditarily appointed tribal chiefs and headmen.28 Such an administrative 
clenched fist is alternatively also referred to as a ‘decentralised despotism’ (Mamdani 1996). In the 
area of the environment in southern Africa, decentralised despotism has manifested itself through 
hierarchy laws that arrogate land and nature to the state whilst denying or restricting customary 
rights (Scoones & Matose 1993; Colchester 2004).29 Customary leaders were functionaries of 
colonial administrations who helped enforce these overdoses of hierarchy preferences in a system 
that was more akin to a decentralised environmental despotism (Scoones & Matose 1993). 
The enormity of the above disparities has seen deracialisation and democratisation agendas carry 
emancipatory appeal in post-independence southern Africa. For instance, in the area of the 
environment, such an agenda has sought to deracialise access to resources by extending the benefits 
of resource conservation to people living directly with the resources. The wildlife sector provided 
pioneering experiences, and will be considered at greater length than other sectors in this article. 
This is not least because the experiences more concretely signify how the operation of regimes of 
hierarchy has, over time, evolved to incorporate alternate preferences of autonomy and 
collaboration of the hitherto marginalised peasant sector.  
The origins of monopolies of hierarchy regimes in the wildlife management sector coincide with the 
incipient phases of the colonial period. For instance, the notion of the ‘King’s game’ earlier defined 
the wildlife as (British) empire resources, under the tutelary custodianship of tributary 
administrations in the colonies (Murombedzi 1992). Tutelary custodianship transformed into state 
custodianship as empire colon administrations evolved into the nation states of southern Africa. 
Initially, mining, and subsequently agriculture, provided the basis for fledging capitalist economies 
within these young nation states. Subsequently, diversification policies sought to strengthen such 
economies by casting them across a range of other sectors, including wildlife.  
In Zimbabwe and Namibia, the entry of wildlife into the economy was enabled by amendments to 
existing wildlife laws of hierarchy in the 1960s and 1970s (Jones & Murphree 2001). Such 
amendments incorporated provisions that extended the benefits of wildlife custodianship to 
European owners of private land, resulting in a boom in both wildlife populations and related 
enterprise (Murphree & Cumming 1991). But such laws remained largely silent about communal 
areas, thus discriminating against them, excluding them from being able to partake in the benefits of 
the boom. The post-independence governments of southern Africa sought to deracialise colonial 
wildlife policies by extending the benefits of wildlife use to the peasantry, particularly in communal 
areas lying close to protected areas. But the peculiar nature of the communal areas, particularly in 
terms of low land resource/human population ratios, could only permit privileging through the 
conferment of collective custodianship titles. Thus, the operation of wildlife policy in communal 
areas is weighted towards the pole of deciding with others, although decisions made for others and 
for oneself also do filter in and impinge on how decisions are made.  
Deracialisation agendas within the areas of the environment continue to be pursued with firm 
resolve in southern Africa, but to what extent is such an agenda delivering along the 
democratisation dimension? The democratising effect of affirmative natural resource policies 
depends on a variety of factors including the locus and nature of units in which the privileges of 
collective custodianship are retired. It also depends on the manner and extent to which intervening 
preferences of hierarchy and autonomy get reconciled against collaboration preferences within the 
collectives concerned.  
The locus of collective custodianship over wildlife resources in the communal areas of southern 
Africa is a topical issue in the literature on democratisation of the sector. In general, the bestowment 
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of such privileges on district structures has served to enhance bureaucratic rent capture 
(Murombedzi 1992). Bureaucratic rent capture usually manifests itself through equity and benefit 
distribution structures that favour the districts at the expense of ordinary citizens (Shackleton & 
Campbell 2001). For instance, in Zambia, where agency bureaucrats still wield more power than 
peasant representatives in the operation of game management areas (GMAs), the proportion of 
benefits that accrue to communities in economic terms is often as low as 35% (Hachileka et al. 
1998). A similar scenario occurs in Malawi where agency bureaucrats enjoy greater discretionary 
power in the operation of village natural resource management committees (VNRMCs) – for 
instance, in the Chimaliro area, the community reportedly gets only 30% of the accruing benefits 
(Kayambazinthu 2000). In Zimbabwe, collective custodianship over wildlife resources in communal 
areas is termed ‘appropriate authority’, and it is held by the rural district councils in which the 
communities in wildlife-rich areas reside. In general, wildlife revenue accruing to peasants from the 
operation of Zimbabwe’s Campfire programme frequently comes too little or too late, or both.30 
Authorities responsible for wildlife resources in the country have sought to address such 
inequalities by proclaiming a guideline that require at least 50% of the accruing revenues to be 
retained by communities, but the proclamation is usually quietly ignored. The same authorities have 
also endeavoured to enforce better equity in the operation of Campfire by threatening to revoke 
appropriate authority status from offending districts, but also with little effect (Jones & Murphree 
2001). Better equity structures have generally emerged in countries like Namibia and Botswana, 
where all the revenue accrues to bodies that are constituted along corporate lines at the community 
level (Jones & Mosimane 2000; Rozeinmeijer & van de Jagt 2000).  
The way in which communities get involved in wildlife management impinges on aspects of 
membership. Wildlife and other natural resource management schemes operating in communal 
areas of Southern Africa reflect various models of membership. Zimbabwe’s Campfire scheme 
defines communities on the basis of political administrative units in which people living in wildlife-
rich areas reside – that model of membership equates with membership by decree. The extent to 
which the model applies depends on how it resolves the fluidity of boundaries and resource-use 
relations typical of communal systems (Lynam et al. 1996). Decrees usually generate irrelevant 
outcomes although they carry the promise of shorter red tape. Having learnt from the Zimbabwean 
experience, Namibia’s conservancy programme was based on a model that emphasises self-
identification and coalescence of interest through the medium of community deliberation. The 
longer red tape associated with the travails of citizen inclusion in such deliberative decision-making 
frameworks makes progress painfully slow (Jones 2001). South Africa’s Fish River case appears to 
entail membership by civic agency, in which some issue of concern spurred residents into a 
partnership of civic association and civic advocacy (Cocks 2000).  
Another distinguishing feature of Malawi’s VNRMCs and Zambia’s GMAs is the dominance of 
customary leaders, particularly chiefs. Some NGOs have used customary leaders as the initial core 
around which they built community natural resource management bodies, as reported by Chahweta 
and Mandondo (in draft) in a woodland management case in Zimbabwe’s north-eastern district of 
Mutoko. Building on existing customary forms carries notions of continuity and is more akin to 
membership by cultural affiliation, but the customary leaders often turn out to be the conduits along 
which elite capture of benefits is entrenched in the communal areas of southern Africa, as reported 
in a micro-credit scheme from south-central Zimbabwe (Mutamba et al. 2000). The nefarious 
activities often signify the opacity associated with the bestowment of broad discretionary powers in 
a few individuals. And in their quest for enhancing transparency, representation and accountability, 
NGOs often sponsor the crafting of new institutions that incorporate marginalised groups, including 
women and the youth. This appears to accord with membership deriving from neo-liberal ideals. In 
practice, these categories are not mutually exclusive, but each category has its upsides and 
downsides, with the challenge being to strike a balance. For instance, Jones (2002) reports an 
internal review process in conservancies of Namibia’s Caprivi region in which communities sought 
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to overcome the logjam of customary resistance by variously co-opting the leaders onto 
conservancy committees. In that sense, the move extinguished autonomy preferences for common 
good interests. But conversely, in Zambia there are moves towards reducing the wide discretionary 
oversight enjoyed by chiefs in the operation of GMAs. Both examples depict the pendulum effects 
that often occur when preferences are poorly reconciled. The foregoing paragraphs of this 
subsection have attempted a critical characterisation of policy operation at the inter-communal area 
level. The next paragraph attempts a much finer-grained analysis of the use of non-mobile resources 
within an intra-communal area scenario 
Almost all land laws in southern Africa define communal lands as state lands, and variously 
delegate the administration of such lands to local governments and state agencies. Most peasant 
communities enjoy usufruct rights to such land and its resources. In practice, these overarching 
frameworks of central rights structures exist side by side with informal customary rights regimes 
that are usually presided over by local traditional leaders, including chiefs, headmen and village 
heads. At the communal interface the two rights structures work out into a tenure system that 
usually accords peasants de facto traditional freehold rights to arable and residential plots, beyond 
which there are woodland and other commons. Resources are usually accessed from the commons 
under various forms of collective and non-collective relations. Such a tenure system impinges on 
the loci of decision-making in natural resource management policy. Decisions pertaining to the de 
facto private arable and residential plots are more in tune with preferences of autonomy, although, 
as earlier argued, the imperatives of hierarchy and collaboration also filter down and impinge on 
these levels. A transition from private to communal entitlements presumably denotes an 
institutional point of inflexion at which preferences of autonomy give way to imperatives of 
collaboration. This point of inflexion often marks the divide along which donor-funded projects 
intervene on communal settings. Usually those inclined towards the pole of autonomy envision 
promoting individual industry and enterprise within the de facto household entitlements, whilst 
those inclined towards the pole of collaboration envisage mitigating the stray of autonomy 
preferences into the commons. 
Resources on private land: A not so splendid isolation? 
As mentioned earlier, private lands were created through colonial land alienation policies that 
entailed the displacement of African tribes to make way for an emerging capitalist economy. 
Prospects for economic opportunity had hitherto drawn many a European to southern Africa. 
Declining prospects in the mining sector enhanced colonial land alienation through diversification 
policies that saw agriculture as another avenue to economic opportunity. Agricultural diversification 
combined individual industry and enterprise with the support of expanded official subsidy to help 
give rise to the region’s agro-industrial complexes, particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
Over time, diversification expanded to other areas including forestry and fisheries. The denial of 
such subsidy to the black peasantry in low agricultural potential areas of the region was one 
manifestation of discriminatory policies. At a broad scale such policies operated through the earlier 
mentioned fiscal apartheid in public sector capital investment policies. As mentioned earlier too, 
such imbalances were as pronounced as the degree to which colonialism found tenure within the 
region, with Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia having been the most impacted upon by a legacy 
of racial privilege. 
Such a legacy is being boldly confronted by nationalist movement governments that ascended to 
power through armed and other forms of struggle against such forms of privilege. Indigenisation 
and affirmative action polices are being deployed to extend the benefits of economic opportunity to 
the black African majority. Among such policies, land reform is the most topical and controversial. 
But the consequence of such reforms depends on the pathways adopted. Parceling out private land 
to big and powerful black entrepreneurs, as in Zimbabwe’s Model A2 schemes, essentially 
constitutes an intra-class transfer of entitlements, from rich white to rich black. It entails land 
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transfer without tenure reform, or the replacement of autonomy preferences with selfsame 
preferences. The model appears to have been inspired by a logic inclined towards the pole of 
maintaining productivity. But low land/human population ratios naturally set a limit to which model 
A2 type land reform is feasible, a dilemma for which the Model A1 schemes appear to be an 
answer. The model entails parceling out private land to communal farmers. A1 schemes entail 
tenure reform and are more akin to replacing autonomy preferences with collaboration regimes, 
particularly from a natural resource management perspective. Thus the model appears to have been 
inspired by a logic inclined towards the pole of decongesting communal lands. Although each 
scheme has its own polar logic, such logics are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Since the scope of this study was regional in outlook, I feel obliged to extend the analysis to 
incorporate perspectives from South Africa, as an example of another country where the land 
reform agenda appears central to emerging visions of empowerment and development. In the 
interests of brevity I have abbreviated comparisons between some experiences emerging from the 
two countries: 
• If processes of reform were largely expedited through short-cycle, fast-track processes that 
‘sort themselves out’ in Zimbabwe, then in South Africa they occur through long cycles of 
legal restitution that get mediated in formal courts of law. To some sections of scholarship, 
the unfolding drama of things ‘sorting themselves out’ signify an ‘authoritarian nationalism 
of selective citizenship and distortions of democracy’ (Raftopoulos 2003), which plays out 
through violence, vandalism and murder. To some it marks the ‘end of modernity’ (Worby 
2003). For Africanist scholarship, the onerous travails of legal restitution in South Africa’s 
courts signify a groundswell of impatience with processes of land reform in that country 
(Kepe & Cousins 2002). 
• If courts provide an onerous means of first resort to addressing pre-restitution land 
grievances in South Africa, then in Zimbabwe the courts provide a fast but pre-emptive 
means of last resort to post-fast track land grievances since the verdicts often get indefinitely 
suspended. To radical African scholars the onerous nature of South African land restitution, 
though signifying presence of the rule of law, represents justice delayed (Kepe & Cousins 
2002). But to neo-liberal scholarship, judicial dilly-dallying with verdicts in the courts of 
Zimbabwe represents justice denied, and signifies an absence of the rule of law. 
• Thus, if the policy in Zimbabwe is ‘take first and talk later’, then in South Africa it is ‘talk 
first and take later’. 
In the concluding section, the discussion ties together all the foregoing theoretical and empirical 
issues within the context of issues outlined in the introduction. 
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5 Discussion 
The question of scale is one amongst existing and emerging issues relating to CBNRM management 
in rural southern Africa. But it is not an entirely new concept, since it has already started receiving 
attention from a range of perspectives – to which there is need to add new insights. This study has 
contributed such insights by tackling scale – reconciling diverse preferences that intervene on the 
natural resource policy arena by decisions alternately made for others, with others and for oneself.  
Throughout this paper I have implicitly and explicitly argued that negotiation provides the key to 
reconciling preferences within and between decision domains intervening on the operation of 
natural resource policy. This is because negotiation as a tool for reconciliation encompasses more 
nuanced evolutionary pathways in which need becomes a key driver of institutional change, as is 
alluded to in the Lakes Chiuta and Kariba artisanal fishing cases discussed earlier. The logic of 
prudence and reversibility in the operation of natural resource policy, which I considered above, 
was borne out by the many cases of community-level bodies whose composition and roles had to be 
reviewed often because: some important players had been left out; or the broad discretionary 
oversight given to some actors was being abused; or emergent outcomes were not egalitarian 
(Section 4.1), and so on. In all of these cases such re-negotiation was more emergent than the 
promoters of the project facilitated it. I therefore argue for the deployment of robust institutional 
infrastructures for monitoring and evaluation in instances where natural resource policy gets 
implemented through the agency of facilitated collaboration. Such monitoring and evaluation 
infrastructure should not be viewed as an unnecessary burden since it provides the minimum 
premium for corrective responses if existing arrangements fail to deliver of intended goals or when 
Ouroboros effects occur, particularly where splendid isolations seek to entrench themselves 
(Section 4). 
I have also outlined general problems that result from inappropriate calibration and targeting of 
natural resource policies, which I presented through the theoretical exposé presented in Section 2. 
Various aspects of these maladies are supported through empirical reflections that are resonant 
throughout Section 3, for example, encroachments of international hierarchy preferences into the 
operation of the southern Africa natural resource management arena through the media of 
international conventions; elite rent capture in buffer zones as an intrusion of appropriative 
autonomy preferences into zones of collaboration; and the operation of command and control 
colonial regulations as decentralized despotisms (Section 4), and so on. The underlying argument in 
all these cases is that all these represent maladies of calibration. I conclude by reiterating that 
negotiation, in its various shades, holds the key to reconciling the diverse preferences that may 
intervene on the natural resource policy arena through the media of decisions made for others, with 
others and for oneself.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Like all typologies, the weakness of this schema is that it compartmentalises phenomena that are interlinked and thus 
not mutually exclusive.  
2 Decentralisations are usually seen as vehicles for delivering on the de-marginalisation agendas. 
3 ‘Alternatives’ is, coincidentally the name of a journal that popularises ideas that challenge received wisdoms, and 
promotes alternative ways of looking at things.  
4 In complex systems parlance such systems retain resilience and sustainability by reconciling variability and diversity 
with persistence and stability (Ruitenbeek & Cartier 2001). For a more comprehensive treatment of these terms see 
Ludwig et al. (1997), who define stability as the tendency of a system to return to a position of equilibrium when 
disturbed, and resilience as the amount of disturbance that a system can sustain before a change in its structure and 
function occurs. 
5 The ‘order and disorder’ clause is a term deriving from chaos theory and used by Reason and Torbett (2001) to argue 
that systems are at their best in terms of adaptiveness and resilience just at the edge of chaos in which there is a balance 
between nascent order and chaos.  
6 The theme of scale and policy as a sequencing and targeting problem is resonant throughout this article. 
7 Institutional components of the toolkit could contain a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation and arrangements 
that allow for review and revision. 
8 Coglianese and Nicolaidis (1996) also refer to regular and scheduled revocability arrangements, which allow for 
power to revert to another level on the tolling of specific dates. They call such arrangements ‘sunset provisions’. 
9 ‘Resource’ is a compound formulation in this case, and it encompasses aspects of skills, know-how, capacity and 
material resources to deliver on given roles.  
10 The ‘voting with their feet’ formulation is used by Nhira et al. (1998) to depict situations whereby people resist 
maligning policies by simply ignoring such policies. Elsewhere, such forms of resistance are referred to as ‘the weapons 
of the weak’ (Scott 1985).  
11 Coglianese advances this somewhat obvious observation in an article appropriately titled ‘Is consensus the 
appropriate basis of regulatory policy?’  
12 In their seminal work on adaptive co-management Ruitenbeek and Cartier (2001) ask whether the key driver of social 
action in relation to the environment is the invisible hand of hand of self-interest or the invisible wand of concern for 
others.  
13 Mafa Chipeta, now with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, was formerly the Deputy Director-
General of the Center for International Forestry Research. 
14 This is a Mafa Chipeta formulation. 
15 For abrasive analyses and insights see, for example, Franz Fanon’s (1978) The wretched of the earth.  
16 The Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe/ Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, 
University of the Western Cape programme which commissioned this paper and a number of others 
(www.cassplaas.org). 
17 These can be likened to impact sequestration mechanisms. 
18 Implicit in the notion of evolution is promise of emergent collaboration. 
19 Vincent (1991) traces the origins of the value assumptions of this essentially ecological concept and its 
transformation into the operation of natural resource management policy. I am most grateful to Gordon Matzke for 
introducing me to this way of looking at the issue in 1992. 
20 Double expropriation is a Murphree and Cumming (1991) formulation that signifies double dispossession.  
21 As opposed to long-duration fast-track land reform entitlements, in which review revoke periods are mooted at a 
whopping 99 years! 
22 Examples provided in both references come from western Zimbabwe where politicians are reported to incite local 
people to invade protected areas, thus providing cover for them to move in to assert de facto grazing rights within state 
forests. Extensive livestock rearing is a major land-use option in this part of the country.  
23 Ostrom (1990) terms salience as the extent of dependence of people on resources, and identifies it as one among a set 
of principles that probably underlie enduring collective action. 
24 The ‘target community’ formulation is another favourite cliché from the lexicon of participatory management 
approaches. 
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25 The use of the term backlash in this context signifies the Ouroboros effect of peasant re-appropriation of the benefits 
of nature.  
26 Paradoxically, this often occurs this time around with the overt support of the self-same actors who would have 
rendered tacit approval in the first instance.  
27 ‘Native’ or ‘African’ reserves was the official designation of communal areas during the colonial period in southern 
Africa. The term was often interchangeably used with ‘tribal areas’ or ‘tribal reserves’. In South Africa, where policies 
of racial segregation were more pronounced, such areas were also derogatively referred to as ‘bantustans’, literally and 
symbolically meaning the homelands of the bantus (for a more perceptive expose see Mamdani 1996).  
28 This is another Mahmood Mamdani formulation.  
29 The combined effect produces the earlier-mentioned Murphree and Cumming ‘double expropriation’. 
30 Campfire is an acronym for the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources. It is premised 
on the concept of wards as ‘producer communities’ or the basic units of social organisation through which communities 
in wildlife-rich areas can be empowered to use and manage the resources. 
